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HERE COME THE NONES! 
Pluralism and Evangelization after Denominationalism and Americanism 
 
This is the author’s accepted version of the article of the same title that appeared 
in Vol. 40, Issue 2 of Horizons (December 2013).  
 
By William L. Portier 
 
Abstract: 
 
This essay begins with a four-part overview of American Catholic history focused on the building and 
dissolution of an immigrant Catholic subculture.  The final period, “Catholics and the Dynamics of 
Pluralism (1968-present)” leads naturally into a discussion of the demography of Catholics in the United 
States.  Particular attention is given to the trend to disaffiliation among millennials and how best to 
interpret it.  Pastoral and theological reflections on the demography of disaffiliation emphasize the need 
for the church in the United States to take on an evangelical form more suited to a pluralism that is post-
denominational and post-Americanist, and how this need might be approached in terms of 
“evangelization” as described in the 1975 Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi.  Concluding 
thoughts sketch some important characteristics of an evangelical church, more concerned with its 
mission and witness in the world than with maintaining its internal life. 
 
Author Vita: 
 
William L. Portier is Mary Ann Spearin Chair of Catholic Theology in the Religious Studies Department at 
the University of Dayton. 
 
No More Catholic Culture - Back in 1967, a group of scholars based at The Catholic University in 
Washington produced the first edition of the multi-volume New Catholic Encyclopedia.
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  The Council’s 
collective effervescence still bubbled in America.  Grandchildren of the immigrants filled convents, 
rectories, and seminaries.   Humanae Vitae was a year away.  Produced in a relatively thick and 
confident subculture, the New Catholic Encyclopedia had no entry on “Evangelization.” 
 Less than a decade later, Pope Paul VI’s Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) introduced “evangelization” 
as a thematic emphasis in contemporary Catholic discourse.  What happened between 1967 and 1975 to 
bring evangelization to the fore?  A simple and inevitably oversimplified answer is the postwar 
dissolution of Catholic subcultures in many western countries.  During these years, for example, 
“decolumnization” in the Netherlands and the fate of Bavarian Catholicism in Germany gave context to 
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the theologies of Edward Schillebeeckx and Karl Rahner respectively.  France is another story.  In the 
United States, at this time, Catholics became demographically indistinguishable from other Americans. 
Their immigrant subculture had done its work well and began to dissolve into American pluralism.   
 From Evangelii Nuntiandi to the present, Catholic literature on evangelization is at one in 
pointing to the challenge of the separation of Gospel and culture.  Catholic culture locates the church in 
real places and embodies it in shared daily practices.  Culture gives rise to what was once a signature 
Catholic sense that the church is there before you get there.  It’s just always there.  Contemporary 
pluralism makes the church more voluntary than it has ever been since the Hellenistic age.  It 
problematizes the very Catholic idea of the church and makes it unmistakably clear that, in the words of 
Evangelii Nuntiandi, the church exists to preach the Gospel.  In 1967, the New Catholic Encyclopedia still 
had culture.  We instead have pluralism, voluntarism, and evangelization.   This essay divides into three 
necessarily brief parts: 1) an immigrant subculture, how it came about and then dissolved, 2) the 
demography of disaffiliation and possible interpretations of it, and 3) some pastoral and theological 
reflections followed by concluding thoughts. 
 History – The story of Catholics in the United States can be told in four parts.  Each contributes 
something central to understanding the present.  Colonial and Republican Catholics (1521-1820) – In 
the new republic, the transnational Catholic Church met for the first time the seeming benign face of 
modern politics.  “When I signed the Declaration of Independence,” wrote Charles Carroll of Carrollton, 
“I had a view not only our independence of England but the toleration of all sects, professing the 
Christian religion, and communicating to them all great rights.”  His cousin John Carroll, named first 
bishop of Baltimore in 1789, claimed that with American independence he had experienced a religious 
revolution greater than the political one.  He credited the United States with having “banished 
intolerance from their system of government.”2  
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 The toleration the Carrolls celebrated makes “religious affiliation,” regardless of its theological 
valence, legally voluntary.  Over time this tends to lead to increasing religious pluralism.  Historians 
ordinarily identify voluntarism and pluralism as the salient characteristics of American “religion.”  After 
the Revolution, Baptists and Methodists on the frontier exploited these characteristic features of 
modern politics to forge an anti-institutional religious ethos in which people believed that one became a 
Christian through personal conversion to Jesus Christ rather than through the traditional inheritance of a 
culture.   
 We might call this ethos “evangelical” and regard it as the form of Christianity best suited to the 
freedoms of modern politics.  It is fascinating to speculate on what might have happened to the small 
body of English Catholics and their descendants in such a religious environment.  But a new variable 
intervened and postponed for more than a century a full blown encounter between Catholics and the 
voluntary and pluralistic religious forms bred by the Revolution.  That variable was the 33.6 million 
immigrants who came to the U.S. from Europe between 1820 and 1920. 
 Immigrant Catholics (1820-1920) – Irish and Germans were followed by Italians and Eastern 
Europeans.  By 1850 they made Catholics “the largest single body of churchgoers in the nation.”3   
Nativism peaked simultaneously.  Immigrants built the railroads and bridges of America’s urban centers.  
The music, art, and architecture of devotional Catholicism, not always the best, fed their souls and 
shaped their imaginations and affections.  The end of the nineteenth century saw hyper-assimilationist 
Catholics or Americanists pitted against their separatist counterparts in a series of controversies over 
whether the U.S. was a benign or hostile place for Catholics.  Separatists were suspicious of a de facto 
Protestant culture that put a premium on individual autonomy and achievement.  Americanists 
proclaimed a providential fit, based in the natural law, between “America” and Catholicism.  Not only 
would America be good for Catholics, but Catholics would save America and help it reach its promise.  In 
1899 Leo XIII’s censure of “Americanism,” the introduction of a false sense of liberty into the church in 
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imitation of modern states, put a temporary halt to this assimilationist project, but, as a central aspect 
of immigrant Catholic experience, the Americanist impulse continued to take on new forms  well into 
the twentieth century. 
 Building and Dissolution of an Immigrant Catholic Subculture (1920-1968) – With the end of 
the Great War, the subsequent closing of U.S. borders to new immigrants, and a secular culture 
beginning to overwhelm the native Protestant one, generations of “brick and mortar” bishops used the 
proudly given voluntary contributions of the laity to build an impressive immigrant subculture.  A far 
from air-tight network of parishes, schools, hospitals, and social service agencies (all staffed largely by 
religious Sisters), along with fraternal and professional organizations like the Knights of Columbus, 
protected many Catholics from nativism, simultaneously socialized them as Americans, and set them on 
the road to economic prosperity.  At the same time, the subculture buffered most Catholics from having 
to face the long-term corrosive effects religious pluralism and voluntarism tend to have on traditional 
forms of faith. 
 By the end of World War II in 1945, immigration had been closed for two decades.  The GI Bill 
opened the doors to higher education for many ethnic Catholic returning veterans.  In 1960 Americans 
narrowly elected John F. Kennedy president.  Descended from Boston Irish, Kennedy had been to 
Harvard and served with distinction in World War II.  By the end of the 1960s, there were many more 
Catholics like Kennedy.  According to such measures as education and income levels, they soon became 
statistically indistinguishable from other Americans.  Though many of its institutions still remain, this 
demographic point signaled the end of the immigrant Catholic subculture.  It coincided with the 
turbulence of the 1960s and the implementation of the Second Vatican Council. 
 Democracy American style emerged from World War II having banished from the moral high 
ground its competitors on both left and right.  At Vatican II, the World War II generation put an end to 
the Church’s conflicts with modern states in Europe and solemnly affirmed religious liberty – a positive 
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form of the tolerance the Carrolls had celebrated.  The Decree on Religious Liberty coincides with and 
marks the shift of European American Catholics from a faith primarily inherited from generations of 
immigrants to a faith known in the midst of pluralism as personally embraced.  The conditions for an 
evangelical form of Catholicism were now in place. 
 Catholics and the Dynamics of Pluralism (1968-present) – Though they could be porous, the 
immigrant Catholic subculture had clear boundaries.  The authentic theology of Vatican II tended to blur 
those boundaries in three important areas: 1) between Christians and members of the faith traditions of 
the world, 2) between Catholics and those now recognized as “separated” fellow Christians, 3) between 
clergy and religious and laity.  The full effects of voluntarism and pluralism began to kick in.  What it 
meant to be a Catholic was not as clear as it used to be.  We started to worry about “Catholic identity.” 
As American Catholics moved up the sociological escalator, their subculture was dissolving into a 
landscape of choice.  What we now call the identity and mission of its remaining institutions need to be 
renegotiated for a voluntary demographic.  At the same time that period of singular social and political 
turbulence known as the “1960s” was underway.  Between 1968 and 1979, I studied graduate theology.  
It was an exhilarating time, but also uniquely unsettled time.  Many of my peers not only left the field, 
they also left the church.  Confusion extended to the highest levels.  The Temptations called the whole 
thing a “Ball of Confusion.” 
 Enter Pope John Paul II.  Say what you will about him.  There is much to say.  Here’s a start.  “The 
redeemer of humanity, Jesus Christ, is the center of the universe of history.”  This was the first line of his 
first encyclical in 1979.  In the midst of the ball of confusion, he reaffirmed the centrality of Christ.  For 
the sake of the church’s mission to the world, and to the consternation of many, he stabilized its internal 
boundaries and redrew them around a Christological center.  At a time when many still expected fully 
formed Catholics to keep sliding down the subculture’s educational chutes, he knew that living churches 
must evangelize or die.  Anxiety about identity did not paralyze him.  Instead he became the world’s 
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premier evangelist.  He introduced the “new evangelization” and wrote much on it, but nothing better 
than Pope Paul VI’s 1975 Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Nuntiandi.  If the phrase “new evangelization” 
is confusing, read Evangelii Nuntiandi. 
 As contemporary U.S. Catholics face the challenge of how to be Catholic without a subculture, 
they must attend to evangelization and formation.  For better or worse, the subculture did much of the 
work of forming Catholics and handing on the faith.  Now young people rarely experience the givenness 
of Catholicism as an inheritance that surrounds them.  In the dynamics of pluralism, they must receive it 
as something they personally embrace.  In an overstocked religious marketplace, we can be confident 
that many young people will be initially attracted to Catholicism.  The church has to offer them 
formation in Catholic patterns of worship, community, and service.  That’s why all the talk about 
evangelization.  Evangelii Nuntiandi identifies Christ himself as the Good News and the first Herald of 
the Gospel.  It calls evangelization the “Church’s specific grace and calling and the activity most 
expressive of her real nature.  The Church exists in order to evangelize.” (para. 14) 
 Demography: Here Come the Nones – The most striking demographic trend in religious America 
is what Robert Putnam and David Campbell have called the “rise of the nones.”4  The nones or the 
religiously unaffiliated first came to national attention with the widely-publicized 2008 Pew Forum “U.S. 
Religious Landscape Survey.”5  Beneath the seemingly calm surface of American religion – 50% 
Protestant, 25% Catholic, 25% other – the survey found significant instability in a notable trend to 
disaffiliation.  In fact, the unaffiliated appeared as the fastest growing “religious” group in the country.  
In 2008 the U.S. was barely hanging on as a Protestant nation at about 51%.  28% of Americans had left 
the faith of their birth.  If we include movement among Protestant bodies, the per cent jumps to 44%.  
Most striking in 2008, however, was that 16.1% of Americans reported no religious affiliation.  By 2012, 
the Protestant majority had disappeared and the nones had risen to nearly 20%.6  The trend to 
 7 
 
disaffiliation is especially strong among millennials or young people between ages 17 and 30.  According 
to Putnam and Campbell in 2011, “a third of Americans in their early 20s were without religion.”7  
 The 2008 Pew Forum survey confirms that the face of Catholicism in the U.S. has changed 
dramatically over the previous forty years since the 1960s. We are once again a church of immigrants.  
Of the estimated 75 million American Catholics in 2010, many were descended from the European 
immigrants who came to the U.S. between 1820 and 1920.  But this well assimilated population is aging.  
In addition, one third of those raised Catholic have left the church, making one in ten Americans in 2008 
a former Catholic.  And yet, over the past forty years, the percentage of Catholics in the U.S. population 
has remained stable at about 25%.  Only 2.6% of Americans in 2008 were converts to Catholicism.  
African American, Asian, and American Indian Catholics together make up about 5% of the Catholic 
population.8  Making up for the loss of European American members through death and disaffiliation are 
new immigrants from places such as Mexico, Central and South America, Vietnam, African countries, 
and the Philippines.  They tend to live in the West/Southwest rather than the Northeast and Midwest.  
By 2012 more than half (52%) of all immigrants to the U.S. were Catholic and 30% of Catholics were born 
outside the U.S.9  Three quarters of these immigrants are from Latin America and the Caribbean.  The 
future of Catholicism in the U.S. has a Lationo/a look.  While one in three Catholics were Hispanic in 
2008, nearly half or 45% of Catholics between 18 and 29 identified themselves as Hispanic in 2011.  
 In 2011 the National Catholic Reporter published the most recent installment of its five-year 
surveys of American Catholics begun in 1987.10  Both text and title, “Persistence and Change,” of the 28-
page digest of the survey results, emphasize the stability of American Catholics over the twenty-five year 
history or the survey.  This looks like a push back against the Pew Forum results of 2008 which 
emphasized fluidity.  For example, the text emphasizes the stability of “highly committed” Catholics over 
the twenty-five years.  But the numbers show that between 1987 and 2011, the “highly committed” 
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decreased from 27% to 19% (14a).  Among 18 to 29 year olds or millennials, the number of “highly 
committed” is only 16% (14a).11   
 Two of the most striking new aspects of the 2011 poll are the comparisons of “Hispanics” and 
“Others” among millennials, and the inclusion of questions on “important reasons” why young people 
report that they do or do not go to weekly Mass.  Mass attendance actually rose among millennials from 
15% in 2005 to 23% in 2011.  But this turns out to be a mixed blessing when we consider that this 8% 
increase “may be attributed to the fact that 26% of Hispanic millennials said they go to Mass every 
week, compared to 20% of non-Hispanic millennials” (6a). 
 Millennials have the lowest reported Mass attendance of all the generations.  The survey rightly 
emphasizes the economic struggles of new Hispanic immigrants in this population.  But the data also 
show that significantly greater levels of Hispanic religious commitment raise the overall religious profile 
of the millennial generation and mask the effects of the trend toward disaffiliation on the 55% of 
millennials who are non-Hispanic.  This masking effect comes into clearer focus when we look at the 
reasons respondents cite for not going to weekly Mass.  “I’m just not a religious person” is cited as an 
important reason by 40% of Catholics across generations.  Only 29% of millennials cite this reason with 
“family responsibilities” understandably leading the way at 48%.  But 42% of non-Hispanic millennials 
cite “I’m just not a religious person” as their most important reason for not going to weekly Mass (24a).  
Factor out the infusion of religious commitment from the 45% of millennials who are Hispanic, and it is 
clear that the trend toward disaffiliation has eaten deeply into the youngest generation of European 
American Catholics.12  Nor is it clear that future generations of Hispanic Catholics will resist the trend to 
disaffiliation any more effectively than their European American predecessors have.   
 Evangelical Catholics – The national trend toward religious disaffiliation has had a significant 
impact on the generation of Catholic millennials.  But there is more.  Among the 16 to 20 million 
Catholics at Mass on a given Sunday in the U.S., are the 16% of “highly committed” millennials identified 
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by the 2011 NCR survey.  Buried without comment in the data tables of this survey are 25% of non-
Hispanic millennials who find the “the Papacy” as “very meaningful” (even when pollsters describe it as 
“a feature of the institutional church”) and who report “devotions such as Eucharistic adoration and the 
rosary” as “very important” to their identity as Catholics.  These numbers do not surprise me.  Such 
responses look like they come from “evangelical Catholics.” But we won’t know for sure until 
sociologists decide that these religious outliers are important enough to study.13  The 2011 research 
team is clearly not interested in them. 
 In his 2009 book The Future of the Church, John Allen identifies “Evangelical Catholicism” as the 
second of ten trends he thinks are revolutionizing the world-wide Catholic Church.  He is careful not to 
rank the trends, but he does list “Evangelical Catholicism” second and makes extensive interpretive use 
of it.  He describes the evangelical Catholic impulse as in part a “thrust toward revival of traditional 
markers of Catholic thought, speech, and practice …”  If it has a “conservative feel,” he cautions that 
“evangelical Catholicism is every bit as creative a response to modernity as liberal Catholicism.”14   
Evangelical Catholics are young people whose high commitment to the church comes through the 
voluntary dynamics of pluralism.  Their occupational hazards are religious consumerism and 
individualism.  They need to be more deeply formed as Catholics, ideally by people who have lived long 
and wisely in the faith.  Evangelical Catholics are relatively few but ubiquitous.  From their ranks come 
many, if not most, undergraduate theology majors, parish youth ministers, and graduate students in 
theology and ministry.  Though they lie outside the trends sociologists study, they are disproportionately 
significant for the future of the Church.  More than their fellow millennials who are trending toward 
disaffiliation, they are potential leaders and change agents in the Church. 
 Interpretating Disaffiliation – What are we to make of this strong trend to disaffiliation among 
college-age Catholics and the simultaneous presence of a small but significant number of what one 
commentator has called intentional or “distilled Catholics”?15  In American Grace (2010), Putnam and 
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Campbell interpret the “nones” politically in terms of what they call a “Shock and Two After-Shocks” 
that rocked religious America.  The shock of “sex, drugs, and rock and roll” in the 1960s was followed by 
the rise of religious conservatism in the in the 1980s.  This was the first after-shock.  The second, “youth 
disaffection from religion” began in the 1990s.   
 Putnam and Campbell argue that young people tend strongly to identify religion and 
“conservatism” in its “theological, social, moral, and political forms.”  They cite Barna Research data that 
identify four words (actually five) with which young Americans tend to associate “religion.”  Church 
leaders and educators would do well to pay close attention to these words: “judgmental, homophobic, 
hypocritical, and too political.” In generational terms, since 2000, “cohorts of whom barely 5% say they 
have no religious affiliation are being replaced by cohorts of whom roughly 25% say they have no 
religion, massively increasing the nationwide incidence of nones.”16  
 Putnam’s and Campbell’s emphasis on the political aspect of disaffiliation can be overstated.  
Broad cultural attitudes, economics, and gender are also involved.  Trust in social institutions is declining 
across the board among the young. In terms of trust, government and big business fare less well than 
churches.  Only the military is faring well.  The massive shifts in religious affiliation (44% in 2008) 
combined with the trend to disaffiliation and the fact that only 6% of the unaffiliated identify as atheists 
and agnostics indicate a “relative decline of institutional religion.” The denominational differences 
among churches appear to be increasingly meaningless.  This could be seen as a “decline of belonging in 
general.”17   
 Putnam and Campbell observe that “religious polarization has increasingly aligned Americans’ 
religious affiliation with their political inclinations.”18  It is true that 70% of nones voted Democratic in 
2012.  Nones make up 24% of the Democratic Party.19   Putnam and Campbell may be correct, but the 
2011 “Catholics in America” survey shows there is also a striking alignment between party affiliation and 
income level.  (See Table 15 at 25a)  It is well-known that marriage also correlates well with income 
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level.  Nones are disproportionately young unmarried white men.  Perhaps there is an important 
economic component in the rise of the nones to which American analysts would be typically blind and to 
which church leaders and educators would do well to pay attention and explore further.  40% of those 
raised unaffiliated backslide into some form of religious affiliation.  It would be interesting to investigate 
the possible economic aspects of this phenomenon and its connection to decline of belonging. 
 The reference to young unmarried white men draws attention to the strikingly gendered 
character of disaffiliation among millennial Catholics.  Two times the number of Catholic women as men 
are currently members of religious communities.  Across generations, women are less likely to be nones 
by 19 to 12%.  But among Catholic millennials, women are slightly more inclined than men not to attend 
Mass.  Though Protestant women do move among denominations, there is no similar decline in church 
attendance among them.  This is a uniquely Catholic phenomenon.  Given the traditional role of women 
in passing on the faith and the fact that 80% of lay ecclesial ministers in the church are women, the 
gendered nature of disaffiliation among millennial Catholics is ominous.20  
 What has been said so far suggests that the trend to disaffiliation among millennials is complex, 
subject to analysis from a variety of perspectives, and perhaps not as “hard” as it might at first appear.   
A recent “Millennial Values Survey” tends to confirm this suspicion.  76% of college-age millennials in 
2012 agreed that modern day Christianity had good values and principles.  63% agree that it consistently 
shows love for other people.21 But then there is the strong anti-institutional bias among millennials and 
the four words, homophobic and judgmental conspicuous among them.  59% of college age millennials 
support gay marriage and only 37% oppose it.  But 44% think it is wrong and only 48% think it’s morally 
acceptable.  64% of college age millennials perceive churches as anti-gay and 62% perceive them as 
judgmental.  Among Christian affiliated college age millennials 58% perceive the churches as anti-gay.  
For the disaffiliated, the figure is 79%.  The terms anti-gay and judgmental suggest that when college-
age millennials think about the issue of gay marriage, they are not thinking ideologically in abstract 
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notional terms of religious liberty, the definition of marriage, or the created nature of human sexuality.  
Rather they are thinking of the specific gay people they know, relatives and friends perhaps, and their 
desire to be treated as ordinary human beings.   
 Putnam and Campbell warn that it would be unwise to think of the nones in ideological terms as 
“a symptom of ineluctable secularization.”22  The trend to disaffiliation is real, but in a hyper-pluralistic 
environment with a decline of belonging in general, it is not unique to churches.  In a culture of choice, 
whether it is a political party, a product, or a basketball team, we know we have to scramble to keep our 
market share, our niche, or whatever we call it.  Everyone must, in a sense, evangelize or die.  It sounds 
crass, but Putnam and Campbell put it this way: “In a religious cafeteria in which rapidly growing 
numbers of young Americans are manifestly unhappy with a menu that is too political or hypocritical for 
their taste, religious entrepreneurs have a powerful incentive to concoct more palatable offerings.  To 
these entrepreneurs the rapidly proliferating nones are an underserved niche, or in more appropriate 
language, souls to be saved.”23   
Pastoral and Theological Reflections – The chief pastoral challenge the Church in the U.S. faces 
is how to hand on the faith to the next generations of young Catholics trending toward disaffiliation and 
who are inclined to describe religious institutions as “judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too 
political.”  A temporary European American Catholic majority has the task of responding in a positive 
way to the new immigrants among us, and especially to the increasing Latino/a face of a church normed 
in the past by east-coast and mid-west immigrant Catholics of a distinctively Irish cast.  
We can no longer assume that “Catholics” refers to a recognizable group who share an identity 
as a people.  The human side of the Church reflects the hyper-pluralism and consumerism of our wider 
culture.  Church often looks like it aligns with our economic and political divisions.  We have differences 
of sensibility in worship, theology, and spiritual practices, some legitimate, some not.  Even in the 
Roman liturgy itself, we now have a choice between ordinary and extraordinary forms.  We have Vatican 
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II Catholics and John Paul II Catholics.  Among the younger generation, we have millennials who are self-
described “just not very religious” people alongside on-fire evangelical Catholics.  In our institutions, we 
struggle, sometimes clumsily, to draw boundaries and articulate a truly Catholic shape.   Pastors have 
the challenge of holding it all together in something like the catholicity of the Creed. 
Catholicism is at a distinct disadvantage on the contemporary religious landscape.  It is an 
historically given culture on an intentional landscape where people tend to view culture as self-
constructed.  It’s a sacramental church in a culture that has ever diminishing trust in institutions and 
rites unless they belong to the military.  You can’t have Catholicism and its culture without priests.  But 
we have an aging, diminishing, overworked clergy with Vatican II priests and John Paul II priests.  We 
have lay ecclesial ministers and permanent deacons, but no ordained women deacons.   
In an anti-institutional environment, the church as a visible public organization is in trouble.  As I 
heard one bishop put it, the early church’s Christological controversies about the relation of humanity 
and divinity in Jesus have migrated to ecclesiology.  The human side of the church threatens to 
overwhelm and obscure the divine side from view.   American Catholics don’t appear to give the church 
a lot of thought.  When they do think about it, the scandal of clergy sexual abuse is the first thing that 
comes to mind.  Around the time Pope Benedict resigned in March, researchers asked a small sample of 
Catholics (184) to say in their own words what they thought was the most important problem facing the 
church.  34% of the sample made some reference to the scandal.   No other response was higher than 
9%.24  According to the 2011 NCR survey, 83% of Catholics across the generations believe that the issue 
of sexual abuse of young people by priests hurts the credibility of church leaders when they speak out 
on political or social issues.  77% across generations agree that this issue has hurt the ability of priests to 
meet the spiritual and pastoral needs of their people (Table 4, 17a).  These are serious numbers25.  At 
the same time, Catholics have recently expressed high satisfaction with the general job the bishops are 
doing.  
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It is not clear that Americans in general give churches much thought.  Recently my family 
attended a production of the musical “Sister Act” in the southern city of Durham, North Carolina.  The 
next morning we went to a Methodist Eucharist in the faux gothic of Duke Chapel.  The presider was a 
woman, the guest preacher was a Catholic.  At the end of “Sister Act,” the full crowd at the Durham 
Performing Arts Center gave the cast a long standing ovation.  The liturgy in Duke Chapel was conducted 
reverently and solemnly in keeping with the traditional rites of the church going back into the first 
millennium, including the words of institution and communion under both kinds.  The woman in front of 
us made a thanksgiving after communion as devout as any I’ve ever seen in a Catholic church.  Ever since 
I have been pondering the question of what the people at the play and in the chapel were seeing on the 
stage and at the altar. 
Talk of religious illiteracy presumes some cultural standard of religious literacy that illiterates fail 
to meet.  We don’t seem to have such a standard. Most Americans, especially the young, simply do not 
know or do not care what the Reformation was about.  The substantive theological differences among 
the various post-Reformation churches in the west, if they matter at all, are no longer decisive.  The fact 
that 44% of Americans in 2008 changed religious affiliation indicates strongly that denominations in 
themselves don’t matter much and we are in fact in a post-denominational society.   
 Catholicism has historically been a culture.  Cultures have shared embodied practices and 
material symbols that shape their boundaries.  But free from post-Reformation identification with papist 
superstition, Catholic practices and material symbols, detachable now from the cultural matrix in which 
they make sense and floating free in the mix, are at least as exotic as Hindu gods and Buddhist practices.  
What’s more they can signify the vague good values and principles, the love for other people, that even 
disaffiliating millennials associate with Christianity.  This only works, I suspect, because our culture at 
least temporarily remains Christian in origin but not in consequence.   
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It would be foolish not to reckon with the trend to religious disaffiliation and the related issues 
raised here.  But in the end, like bills and tax returns, cluttered inboxes and Facebook walls, they are as 
ephemeral as the psalmist’s grass and flowers.  If Catholicism is no longer a working culture, we are 
thrown back on the one thing necessary, the one thing that matters.  Only one thing lasts, and that is 
Jesus Christ, the center of the universe and of history.   
Earlier, I made reference to the new evangelization, the split between Gospel and culture, and 
the eloquence with which Evangelii Nuntiandi describes evangelization.  It begins with Christ, the 
content of the Gospel, and salvation in him.  If disaffiliating millennials are not interested in Christ’s 
salvation, we will have to show them what it is.  Telling them will not cut it.  Evangelii Nuntiandi goes on 
to say that “in the Church the witness given by a truly Christian life lived in close communion with God 
and fervent dedication to neighbor must be regarded as the basic means of evangelization …” In a 
teeming post-denominational religious marketplace, “people listen more willingly to witnesses than to 
teachers, or, if they listen to teachers, it is because they are witnesses” (para. 40) 
Evangelii Nuntiandi  concludes with a ringing exhortation  to authentic witness: “The world 
shows countless signs that it rejects God, and yet, despite what many think, the world is also looking for 
God in unexpected ways and feels a deep need of God.  The world is looking for preachers of the Gospel 
who will to speak to it of a God they themselves know, a God who is close to them, as though they saw 
the invisible one (Heb: 11-27).  The world wants and expects from us simplicity of life, prayerfulness, 
love for all, especially the lowly and the poor, obedience and humility, self-forgetfulness and 
renunciation.  If we lack this holiness, only with difficulty will our words reach the hearts of modern men 
and women; they will risk being empty and fruitless.”  Pope Francis could have written this. 
Perhaps we trust the rites and institutions of the military because we know that, over the past 
decade of war, soldiers have repeatedly staked their lives on them.  We all know that martyr means 
witness.  The Church can only evangelize a disaffiliating generation through the holy witness of its 
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people.  Whether it be Mother Teresa or Dorothy Day, people recognize holy witness when they see it.  
What they don’t see or recognize are the culturally embedded practices of daily life such as the 
Eucharist that mediate the life of Jesus to people like Dorothy Day and Mother Teresa.  When Nicholas 
Kristof was writing his recent columns from Africa, he was rightly taken by the witness of the religious 
sisters he met there and took a certain delight in contrasting them with bishops and the “institutional 
church.”  Every time I finished one of these columns, I wished I could ask Nicholas Kristof where he 
thought these holy women came from and if he realized how they were formed by the practices of 
religious life in the church to be the people he admired.   
Concluding Thoughts –  
1. In a post-denominational situation of deep pluralism, the church’s presence has to be primarily 
evangelical and Christ-centered.  Catholicism will always be a culture, but its culture must now 
be streamlined in the interest of forming holy witnesses.  The boundaries might not be as sharp 
and clear as they were in an ecclesial atmosphere of post-Reformation controversy and over-
specified confessional identities.  Without the off putting tone and partisan political agenda, I 
want to affirm George Weigel’s plea in Evangelical Catholicism that institutional maintenance 
not overshadow the church’s mission.  Evangelical witness in the world must take precedence 
over institutional maintenance. 
2. In such a church, it will be harder to be a liberal Catholic with a primary agenda of large-scale 
internal church reform on the model of Vatican II (see note 24 above).  The boundaries 
reformers are accustomed to push against are no longer as clear and secure as they might have 
been in a Catholic subculture. Internal reform will happen but it will be more modest in the 
direction of clean up and simplicity.  The tribe of liberal Catholics, at least if they are primarily 
advocates of institutional maintenance as internal church reform on a big scale, will likely grow 
smaller. 
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3. Those who perceive the boundaries most clearly, e.g., evangelical Catholics and especially 
converts to Catholicism who have theologically worked their way through post-Reformation 
controversy and concluded that the Catholics had the better of it, will be fearful of violating the 
boundaries  and tempted to defend them stridently.  This would be a mistake and draw 
attention away from the compassionate witness of “simplicity of life, prayerfulness, love for all, 
especially the lowly and the poor, obedience and humility, self-forgetfulness and renunciation” 
called for by Evangelii Nuntiandi. 
4. The presence of Hispanic Catholic immigrants from more traditionally oriented cultures is a 
game changer that simply must be taken into account.  The Latino/a presence has allowed 
researchers to pass over the deep changes among European American Catholics, especially 
among millennials.  These two internally diverse populations require the church to work out 
different sets of pastoral responses. 
5. Americanism is over. The belief that there is a providential fit between the political institutions 
of the United States and the Catholic natural law tradition, is a remnant of an earlier immigrant 
church.  If John Courtney Murray were writing now, he would have to end We Hold These Truths 
with the penultimate chapter entitled “The Doctrine is Dead.”  How could he possibly write the 
final chapter, “The Doctrine Lives”?  Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, moving on through 
Roe v. Wade to the Supreme Court’s recent overturning of DOMA, American jurisprudence has 
consistently rejected inscribing into law key elements of natural law doctrine as the church has 
traditionally understood it .26  Catholics can no longer expect American culture to reflect Catholic 
natural law principles.  The transhuman looms on the horizon.  In its laws and shared public 
culture, if not in the souls of its people, the United States is more like the French Third Republic 
than Murray’s post-war America.  Catholics cannot save the United States.  But this is our home 
and we must shape our practical political judgments as post-Americanism requires.  In our 
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situation, French theologians of the Third Republic, with their emphasis on drawing deeply from 
the tradition for the present, will become increasingly relevant. 
6. “Catholic” cannot be a brand to be policed and protected.  In the face of “judgmental, 
hypocritical, homophobic, and too political,” evangelization based on compassionate witness 
must be primary, taking precedence over the protection of theological and legal boundaries.  
Compassionate holy witness comes first, with the shape of life that makes it possible coming 
later.  This was the pattern of the Christians of the first three centuries, a period with uncanny 
similarities to our own.  Even the appearance of cruelty and inhumane behavior to protect the 
brand cannot be a way to advance the cause of the Gospel.  In his conduct to date, Pope Francis 
offers a parable about how compassionate witness looks.   
Evangelization and Theology –In post-denominational pluralism, the distinction between teaching 
theology and evangelization can be overstated.  In teaching other faith traditions, we regularly take care 
to present Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam as lived religious paths and not simply lists of exotic beliefs.  
We are concerned to show how the Buddha functions for his Mahayana devout, Síva for his faithful, or 
the prophet Muhammad for the straight path of Islam.  In Newman’s terms, we want students to have 
both notional (intellectual) and real (in terms of imagination and affections) apprehensions of these 
traditions. 
In a post-denominational society with fading Protestant and Catholic cultural residues, Christianity 
itself, always complicated depending on the strength of its residual cultural effects, is as potentially alien 
and exotic to our students as Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam.  Sympathetic notional and real accounts of 
how Jesus works in Christian living have the same epistemological status as the examples in the previous 
paragraph.  Given the prevailing distrust of institutions among the young and the concomitant 
incomprehensibility of denominational difference, we are thrown back on holy witnesses to introduce 
theology and make clear the difference Jesus actually makes in peoples’ lives.  Saints and witnesses 
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convey that Christianity is more than beliefs and rules and raise questions about the shape of a life, 
formed in part by rules and beliefs, that makes holiness possible.   
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